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In this paper we compare the transmission of a conventional monetary policy
shock with that of an unexpected decrease in the term spread, which mirrors
quantitative easing. Employing a time-varying vector autoregression with
stochastic volatility, our results are two-fold: First, the spread shock works
mainly through a boost to consumer wealth growth, while a conventional
monetary policy shock affects real output growth via a broad credit / bank
lending channel. Second, both shocks exhibit a distinct pattern over our
sample period. More specifically, we find small output effects of a conventional
monetary policy shock during the period of the global financial crisis and
stronger effects in its aftermath. This might imply that when the central
bank has left the policy rate unaltered for an extended period of time, a
policy surprise might boost output particularly strongly. By contrast, the
spread shock has affected output growth most strongly during the period of the
global financial crisis and less so thereafter. This might point to diminishing
effects of large scale asset purchase programs.
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1 Introduction
With the onset of the global financial crisis the US Federal Reserve (Fed) began
to lower interest rates to stimulate the economy. Since December 2008, however,
the Federal funds rate (FFR) is effectively zero, leaving no room for conventional
monetary policy to further enhance economic growth. Against the backdrop of
lackluster economic conditions and the perceived risks of deflation at that time, the
US Fed decided to engage in ”unconventional” monetary policy which took mostly
the form of asset purchases from the private banking and non-banking sector. After
three large scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs), assets on the central bank’s
balance sheet more than quadrupled since 2007 to about 4,500 billion US dollar in
February 2015.
While a large body of empirical literature has hitherto investigated how conven-
tional US monetary policy affects the real economy, there is scant empirical evidence
on the transmission of quantitative easing (QE). QE implies switching from interest
rate targeting steered via reserve management to targeting the quantity of reserves
(Fawley and Juvenal, 2012). In the USA, the Fed did so by buying longer-term se-
curities either issued by the US government or guaranteed by government-sponsored
agencies. This should directly put downward pressure on long-term yields in these
markets. In addition, financing conditions will ease more generally, since investors
selling to the Fed reinvest those proceeds to buy other longer-term securities such as
corporate bonds and other privately issued securities (portfolio re-balancing, Joyce
et al., 2012). On the back of increased equity prices and heightened loan demand,
both private sector wealth and asset growth in the banking sector should tick up,
leading to an increase in aggregate demand.
The strength of these transmission channels is likely to depend on the current
economic environment. In fact, and considering the transmission of conventional
monetary policy, several authors have suggested that the transmission mechanism
has changed over time (see e.g., Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Boivin et al., 2010). This
might hold especially true for the most recent past that includes the global financial
crisis marking a severe rupture of the financial system and the way how monetary
policy is conducted. Arguments why a monetary policy shock might have smaller
effects during recessions associated with financial crises such as the one in 2008/09
include balance sheet adjustments and deleveraging in the private sector, which typ-
ically takes place after economic boom phases that predate financial crises (Bech et
al., 2014). Also heightened uncertainty might weigh on business climate and impede
investment growth. Aastveit et al. (2013) and Hubrich and Tetlow (2014) investi-
gate monetary policy in times of financial stress or heightened uncertainty and find
smaller effects in these periods for the USA and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2013) find
more generally that US monetary policy is less effective during recessions. Whether
these arguments carry over to unconventional monetary policy is less researched.
Recent work actually suggests the opposite. For example, Engen et al. (2015) em-
phasize the role of quantitative easing in underpinning the commitment of the Fed
to be accommodative for a longer period. This signaling channel is more effective
when financial markets are impaired and economic conditions characterized by high
uncertainty. This reasoning ascribes quantitative easing the greatest effectiveness
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during the onset of a crisis, contrasting the empirical work on the effectiveness of
conventional monetary policy during financial crises. In a recent paper, Wu, Tao
(2014) corroborate this result attesting the latest asset purchase programs a smaller
effect than the earlier ones.
In this paper we address these questions within a coherent econometric frame-
work. More specifically, and to cover a broad range of potential transmission chan-
nels, we propose a simple Bayesian estimation framework that handles medium- to
large-scale models, allows for drifting parameters and time-varying variances and
covariances. Akin to Baumeister and Benati (2013), we model the asset purchases
of the US Fed by assuming a compression of the yield curve. The transmission of
the ”spread shock” is compared with that of a conventional monetary policy shock.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: First, we find evidence that un-
conventional monetary policy works mainly via the wealth channel thereby spurring
aggregate demand. There is less evidence for the credit / bank lending channel.
Second, conventional monetary policy works strongly through expanding assets and
deposits of the banking sector, while the impact on consumer wealth growth is more
modest. Last, for both shocks we find a distinct pattern over our sample period.
More specifically, we find small output effects of a conventional monetary policy
shock during the period of the global financial crisis and stronger effects in its af-
termath. This might imply that when the central bank has successfully committed
the policy rate to a certain value, an unexpected deviation from that commitment
might boost output growth particularly strongly. By contrast, the spread shock has
affected output growth most strongly during the period of the global financial crisis,
when the Fed launched its first asset purchase program and less so thereafter. This
might point to diminishing effects of large scale asset purchase programs on real
output growth.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the econometric frame-
work and how we identify the monetary policy and the term spread shock. Section 3
investigates the effects and the transmission of the two shocks over time, while Sec-
tion 4 concludes.
2 Econometric framework
In this section we introduce the data, the econometric framework and the identifi-
cation strategy to investigate the transmission of unconventional and conventional
monetary policy. We use a novel approach to estimation based on work by Lopes et
al. (2013) that can handle medium- to large scale time-varying vector autoregressions
with stochastic volatility (TVP-SV-VAR).
2.1 Data
Our analysis is based on variables typically employed in monetary vector autoregres-
sions and on quarterly frequency. The time period we consider spans from 1984Q1
to 2015Q1 and the variables comprise real GDP growth (∆gdp), consumer price
inflation (∆p), the federal funds rate (is) and the term spread (sp) defined as the
yield on 10-year-government bonds minus the Federal Funds rate. In addition to
these standard variables, we include several variables that should allow us to gauge
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the importance of different channels for monetary policy transmission. These are
growth in net household and non-profit organizations’ wealth (∆wealth), growth in
commercial banks’ assets and deposits (∆banks assets,∆banks deposits) and the
net interest rate margin (nim) of large US banks. Growth rates are calculated as
log-differences and are thus in quarter-on-quarter terms.1
2.2 The TVP-SV-VAR model with a Cholesky structure
In what follows we draw on a new approach to estimate a TVP-SV-VAR. This ap-
proach differs to standard estimation by recasting the VAR as a system of unrelated
regressions and imposing a recursive structure on the model a priori.
We collect the data in an m = 8× 1 vector
yt = (∆gdpt,∆pt,∆wealtht, is,t,∆banks assetst,∆banks depositst, spt, nimt)
′.
Now, we assume the individual elements of yt to be described by a set of equa-
tions, with the first equation i = 1 given by
y1t = c1t +
p∑
j=1
b1j,tyt−j + e1t (2.1)
e1t ∼ N (0, λ1t) (2.2)
and for i = 2, . . . ,m
yit = cit +
i−1∑
s=1
ais,tyst +
p∑
j=1
bij,tyt−j + eit (2.3)
eit ∼ N (0, λit) (2.4)
where cit (i = 1, . . . ,m) denotes a constant and the ais,t are coefficients associated
with the first i−1 elements of yt with a1s,t = 0 for s = 1, . . . , i−1. b′ij,t (j = 1, . . . , p)
are m-dimensional coefficient vectors associated with the p = 2 lags of yt in each
equation. Finally, eit is a normally distributed error with time-varying variance
given by λit. Note that all coefficients in Eqs (2.1)- (2.4) are allowed to vary over
time.
We assume that ais,t evolves according to
ais,t = ais,t−1 + uit for i = 2, . . . ,m. (2.5)
1Data on real GDP growth (GDPC96), CPI inflation (CPALTT01USQ661S), the effective fed-
eral funds rate (FEDFUNDS) calculated as the quarterly average of daily rates, 10-year-government
bond yields to proxy long-term interest rates (IRLTLT01USQ156N), net worth of households
and nonprofit organizations resembling consumer wealth (TNWBSHNO) deflated by the per-
sonal income deflator (PCECTPI) and net interest rate margins for large US banks (USG15NIM)
are from the Fred data base, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Data on commer-
cial banks’ assets (FL764090005.Q, FL474090005.Q), deposits (FL763127005.Q, FL764110005.Q
FL763131005.Q, FL763135005.Q,FL762150005.Q) are from the financial accounts data base of the
federal reserve system, http://www.federalserver.gov/releases/z1/about.htm.
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uit is a standard white noise error term with variance σ
2
i . Equation (2.5) implies that
the parameters associated with the contemporaneous terms are following a random
walk.
Let us define amp-dimensional vector bit = (bi1,t, . . . , bip,t)
′. Similarly to Eq. (2.5)
we assume that bit follows the subsequent law of motion
bit = bit−1 + vit. (2.6)
with vit being a vector white noise error with variance-covariance matrix equal to
Qi. Finally, the λits follow
hit = µi + ρi(hi,t−1 − µi) + ηit for i = 1, . . . ,m, (2.7)
where hit = log(λit) denotes the log-volatility, µi is the mean of the log-volatility
and ρi ∈ (−1, 1) the autoregressive parameter. ηit is the zero-mean error term
with variance ς2i . Several studies have shown that it is important to allow for both
changes in residual variances and parameters. Assuming constant error variances,
while they are in fact time-varying, could lead to misleading parameter estimates of
the VAR.2 Moreover, changes in the economic environment can affect how monetary
policy transmits to the real economy. In other words, previous literature suggested
that the volatility of economic shocks also tends to influence real activity (Bloom,
2009; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011).
The reason why the log-volatility process is assumed to be stationary in contrast
to the non-stationary state equation of the autoregressive parameters is mainly due
to the fact that a random walk assumption for the log-volatility would imply that it
is unbounded in the limit, hitting any lower or upper bound with probability one.
In practice, however, the differences between a stationary and non-stationary state
equation is negligible since the data is not really informative about the specific value
of ρi.
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The model given by Eq. (2.1) - Eq. (2.4) can be recast in a more compact form
by collecting all contemporaneous terms on the left-hand side
Atyt = ct +
p∑
j=1
Bjtyt−j + et (2.8)
where At denotes a m × m lower triangular matrix with diagonal diag(At) = ιm
and the typical non-unit/non-zero element given by −asj,t. Here, we let ιm be a
m-dimensional unit vector. In what follows we collect free elements of At in a
m(m− 1)/2 vector at. ct is a m× 1 vector of constants and Bjt = (b′1j,t, . . . , b′mj,t)′
denotes a m×m dimensional coefficient matrix to be estimated. The m-dimensional
error vector has zero mean and a diagonal time-varying variance-covariance matrix
given by Λt = diag(λ1t, . . . , λmt). Equation (2.8) resembles the structural TVP-
SV-VAR model put forth in Primiceri (2005). The lower triangular nature of At is
2See for example, Cogley and Sargent (2005), who in response to criticism raised by Sims (2001),
extend their TVP framework put forward in Cogley and Sargent (2002) to allow for stochastic
volatility.
3In fact, experimenting with stationary state equations for ait and bit leaves our results qual-
itatively unchanged.
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closely related to a recursive identification scheme, which assumes a natural ordering
of variables. In fact we use the ordering as the variables appear in yt. However, note
that we do not identify the shocks based on this Cholesky decomposition. Rather
we impose the triangular structure due to computational reasons only, while identi-
fication of the shocks will be based on sign restrictions discussed in subsection 2.4.
Our structural analysis will thus be unaffected by the triangular structure imposed
on the model. In subsection 3.3 we show that estimates based on a different ordering
yield virtually the same impulse response functions.
In the absence of specific assumptions on At, the model in Eq. (2.8) is not
identified. Thus, researchers usually estimate the reduced form imposing restrictions
that originate from theory ex-post. The reduced form of the TVP-SV-VAR is given
by
yt = dt +
p∑
j=1
F jtyt−j + ut (2.9)
with dt = A
−1
t ct, F j = A
−1
t Bj and ut = A
−1
t et. The reduced form errors ut are
normally distributed with variance covariance matrix given by Σt = A
−1
t Λt(A
−1
t )
′.
It can easily be seen that the matrix At establishes contemporaneous links between
the variables in the system.
To emphasize the distinct features of our estimation strategy, it is worth men-
tioning how this model is traditionally estimated. Typically, one would start with
the complete system of reduced form equations given in Eq. (2.9) and obtain re-
duced form parameter estimates by employing Gibbs sampling coupled with a data
augmentation scheme (Primiceri, 2005; Cogley et al., 2005). This approach to esti-
mation comes along with a significant computational burden. To be more precise, if
as in our case m = 8 and the number of lags is set to p = 2, the algorithms outlined
in Carter and Kohn (1994) and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (1994) require the inversion of
a k×k variance-covariance matrix at each point in time. In our case k = m(mp+1)
would be k = 163 rendering estimation with the traditional algorithms cumber-
some.4
Following Lopes et al. (2013) we impose a Cholesky structure a priori, estimate
the structural form in an equation-by-equation fashion, use the estimated coefficients
to solve Eq. (2.8) and finally to obtain Eq. (2.9).5 Using an equation-by-equation
approach decreases the computational burden significantly, by first reducing the
dimension of the matrices that have to be inverted. More specifically, while the in-
version of a k×k matrix requiresm3(mp+1)3 operations using Gaussian elimination
we reduce this to m(mp + 1)3, which is a marked gain as compared to full-system
estimation. Second, and more importantly, equation-by-equation estimation can
make full use of parallel computing.
4Another strand of the literature proposes factor augmented VARs (FAVARs) with drifting
parameters and stochastic volatility (Korobilis, 2013). While FAVARs provide a flexible means of
reducing the dimensionality of the estimation problem at hand they could also lead to problems
with respect to identification and structural interpretation of the underlying shocks.
5Recently, Carriero et al. (2015) suggested a similar approach to the estimation of Bayesian
VAR models with stochastic volatility.
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2.3 Bayesian Inference
We use a Bayesian approach and impose tight priors on the variance-covariance
structure in the various state equations, which describe the law of motion for the
parameters.
General prior setup and implementation
Following Primiceri (2005) and Cogley et al. (2005) we impose a normally distributed
prior on the free elements of the initial state At which are collected in a vector a0
and on b0 = vec(Bj0)
a0 ∼ N (a0,V a), (2.10)
b0 ∼ N (b0,V b), (2.11)
where a0 and b0 are prior mean matrices and V a and V b are prior variance-
covariance matrices. We follow common practice (Primiceri, 2005) and use a training
sample of T = 30 quarters to scale the priors. We set the prior mean for a0 and
b0 equal to the OLS estimate based on this training sample. The prior variance-
covariance matrices are specified such that V a = 4 × Vˆ a and V b = 4 × Vˆ b, with
Vˆ a and Vˆ b being the variances of the OLS estimator.
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The priors on the variance-covariances in the state equations (2.5) and (2.6) are
of inverted Wishart form:
S ∼ IW(vS,S), (2.12)
Q ∼ IW(vQ,Q), (2.13)
with S denoting the variance-covariance matrix of at. This matrix is block-diagonal
with each block corresponding to the m equations of the system. The degree of
freedom parameters are denoted by vS and vQ and the corresponding prior scaling
matrices are labeled as S and Q. In principle we set vS = vQ = T and S = k
2
S× Vˆ a
with kS being a scalar parameter controlling the tightness on the propensity of
at to drift. We set k
2
S = 0.01 after having experimented with a grid of different
values. The results remain qualitatively unchanged as long as the prior is not set
too loose, placing a lot of prior mass on regions of the parameter space which imply
explosive behavior of the model. We use the same hyperparameters for the prior on
Q, i.e., vQ = T and Q = k
2
b × Vˆ b with k2b = 0.01. Again, this choice is based on
experimenting with a grid of values ruling out hyperparameter choices that imply
excessively explosive behavior of the model.
We impose the following prior setup on the parameters of Eq. (2.7)
µi ∼ N (µi, V µ) (2.14)
ρi + 1
2
∼ Beta(γ0, γ1) (2.15)
ς2i ∼ G(1/2, 1/2Bσ). (2.16)
6Since we estimate the model on an equation-by-equation basis Vˆ a and Vˆ b are block diagonal
matrices.
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Finally, we follow Kastner and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2013) and set µ
i
= 0 and
V µ = 10, implying a loose prior on the level of the log-volatility. The prior on ρi is
set such that a lot of prior mass is centered on regions for ρi close to unity, providing
prior evidence for non-stationary behavior of hit. Thus we set γ0 = 25 and γ1 = 1.5.
For the non-conjugate Gamma prior on ς2i we set Bσ equal to one. The appendix
contains a brief sketch of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to
estimate the model.
2.4 Structural identification
To identify a US monetary policy shock and a shock to the term spread we use a
set of sign restrictions put directly on the impulse responses. More specifically, we
identify a ”monetary policy” or ”term spread” shock by singling out from a set of
generated responses those that comply with our a priori reasoning how the economy
typically responds to either of the shocks. The restrictions refer to the directional
movements of impulse responses on impact and are outlined in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
We look at two monetary policy shocks and three broad transmission channels.
We assume that an expansionary conventional monetary policy shock works via an
unexpected lowering of the short-term interest rate. The most direct way lower
interest rates feed into the economy is via the ”interest rate / investment” channel.
The decrease in the policy rate lowers the user cost of capital thereby spurring
investment and real GDP growth (Ireland, 2005). In addition, aggregate demand can
also increase through a boost to ”consumption wealth” as advocated in Ludvigson
et al. (2002). Following a monetary expansion, equity prices are likely to tick up
since the price of debt instruments rises in parallel with the reduction of the short-
term rate making them less attractive for investors (Ireland, 2005). This leads to an
increase in consumer wealth which might boost consumption spending and aggregate
demand (Ludvigson et al., 2002).
The cut in short-term interest rates has also bearings on the financial side of
the economy. We assume an increase in the term spread in response to a decrease
of the policy rate. This can be motivated by an imperfect pass-through along the
term structure implying that long-term interest rates do not follow the decrease in
short-term interest rates one-to-one (Baumeister and Benati, 2013).7 Trailing the
term spread, net interest rate margins of banks tend to increase (Adrian and Shin,
2010). How does this affect asset and deposit growth of the banking sector? First,
the decrease in the long-term rate (even if less pronounced than that of short-rates)
makes taking a loan cheaper. That is the demand for loans is strengthened by
the policy induced decrease of the short-term rate. This effect is amplified by an
improvement of balance sheets of households and firms on the back of the policy
induced rise of asset prices, which increases the demand for loans by those that
were previously excluded from access to credit (”balance-sheet channel”). Second
7More specifically, an unexpected monetary expansion can be expected to drive up inflation
and therefore inflation expectations. This in turn implies long-rates to decrease less strongly than
short rates causing a widening of the yield curve (Benati and Goodhart, 2008).
8
and since net interest rate margins increase, generating new loans becomes more
attractive for banks (compared to faring excessive reserves with the Fed). That
is the supply for loans is stimulated as well. As a consequence, deposit growth is
assumed to tick up. The newly generated loans will increase deposits mechanically
since for each newly issued loan the bank creates a deposit of the same amount. On
top of that, the increase of reservable deposits created by the monetary expansion
will reduce the amount of managed liabilities banks need to fund their loans. This
might be passed on to their clients by lowering loan rates and increasing loan supply
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Black et al., 2007). We summarize these developments
under a broad ”credit and bank lending channel”. Naturally, aggregate demand is
positively affected by loan growth which leads to more investment and consumption.
Second, we investigate a shock to the term spread. Since the purchases of longer-
term securities has significantly lowered longer-term yields – as demonstrated e.g.,
in Doh (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011),
and Hamilton and Wu (2012) – assuming a reduction of the term spread, can be
thought of a way to model the effects of quantitative easing within a standard
monetary VAR framework. In contrast to a conventional expansionary monetary
policy shock, asset purchases by the central bank will trigger a decrease in the term
spread. As with the monetary policy shock, a shock to the term spread will trigger
an increase in equity prices since yields on debt securities decline. An increase
in consumer wealth, coupled with eased finance conditions should spur economic
activity and inflation. That asset purchase programs had an effect on consumer
confidence through signaling has been emphasized in Engen et al. (2015) and Wu,
Tao (2014). While we can investigate the signaling channel implicitly by tracing
the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy through periods of different
financial and economic conditions, we cannot model this transmission mechanism
explicitly by including a suitable control variable. Looking at the financial side
of the economy, the reduction of the term spread triggers a decrease in net interest
margins of commercial banks: since the cost of funding (the short-term interest rate)
is unaltered and tied to the zero lower bound, the revenues of lending (approximated
by the long-term interest rate) decreases. As in Adrian and Shin (2010) this implies
an inward shift of the supply curve of credit and is likely to contain new lending.
This effect, however, might be offset by a stronger demand for lending, since lower
long-term rates make it more attractive to take a loan. Since a priori we do not
know which of these effects is likely to dominate, we leave the signs on growth in
bank assets unrestricted. Next and in line with the assumption about the monetary
policy shock, we assume an initial increase in banks’ deposits. This increase is
rather mechanical since the proceeds of the asset purchase will be deposited in the
investors’ banks’ accounts raising deposits of the banking sector and might be rather
short-lived as pointed out in Butt et al. (2014).8
Last and to mimic the current monetary policy environment in the USA with
the federal funds rate standing technically at the zero lower bound we will hold the
8In case the Fed purchases assets directly from the banking sector, the proceeds would be
charged to the banks’ reserve balances with the Fed, leaving deposits untouched. The positive
restriction on deposit growth is warranted since part of the Fed’s purchases directly concern the
private non-banking sector.
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response of the short-term interest rate constant at zero for eight quarters (Baumeis-
ter and Benati, 2013). Note that this is unrelated to identification of the shock, for
which restrictions are only binding on impact. The appendix provides further details
on the technical implementation of the sign restrictions and the zero restriction on
the short-term interest rate for the spread shock.
3 Empirical results
Before we investigate the transmission of the monetary policy and the term spread
shock, we briefly summarize the movements of the two identified shocks over time.
This should yield further confidence regarding the appropriateness of the proposed
restrictions to recover the shocks. Figure 1 shows the structural errors, left panel
relating to the term spread shock, mid panel to the monetary policy shock. For
completeness we also show the evolution of the actual Federal Funds Rate and the
term spread in the right panel.
[Fig. 1 about here.]
Looking at the term spread shock first, we have indicated three distinct time
periods by red vertical bars, namely the start of the Clinton debt buy back program
(Q1 2000 to Q4 2001), which was in many ways similar to an LSAP, and the start
of LSAPs I to III (Q4 2008, Q4 2010 and Q3 2012, see Dunne et al., 2015). The
figure shows that negative surprises to the term spread indeed coincide with these
periods. There is also a pronounced negative shock visible in the last quarter of
2003 in which the term spread started to decrease sharply (see right panel, Fig. 1).
The monetary policy shock is shown in the mid panel. For comparison we also
plot a monetary policy shock series based on the narrative approach put forward
in Romer and Romer (2004) extended to cover the period up until Q4 2008.9 Both
shocks identify the same monetary policy cycle and the correlation between the
series amounts to about 0.6.
3.1 How do term spread and monetary policy shocks affect output
growth and inflation?
In this section we examine the overall impact of the two shocks on the economy. In a
second step we analyze through which channels the shocks affect aggregate demand
and CPI inflation. To this end, we report impulse response functions in figures 2
and 4 and a related forecast error variance decomposition in figures 3 and 5. All
results are based on 500 draws from the full set of 15,000 posterior draws that have
been collected after a burn-in phase of 15,000 draws. Both shocks are normalized
to a 100 basis points (bp) reduction of the policy rate and results are shown for real
GDP growth, inflation, wealth growth and banking sector variables.
9To be precise, the narrative shock is transformed to quarterly frequency by simply averaging
over the corresponding months. The monetary policy shock corresponds to the smoothed structural
residuals of the interest rate equation in the VAR. In general, residuals of the VAR are more
volatile due to the inherent iid assumption, which is why we opted for smoothing the residuals
which facilitates visual comparison to the more persistent narrative shocks.
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The top panel of Fig. 2 lists results for real output growth, on the left-hand in
response to the conventional monetary policy shock and on the right-hand side in
reaction to the term spread shock. Note that we have opted for slicing the time-
varying impulse responses by fixing time periods of interest to show accompanying
credible sets (25% to 75% in dark blue and 16% to 84% in light blue). These periods
relate to the global financial crisis, namely the pre-crisis period (1991Q1 to 2007Q3),
the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q2) and its aftermath (2009Q3 to 2015Q1).10
[Fig. 2 about here.]
[Fig. 3 about here.]
Looking at the unexpected lowering of the policy rate first, we find positive
and tightly estimated responses up until eight quarters indicating rather persistent
effects on output growth. This holds true throughout the sample periods considered.
The size of the effects, however, varies with the period under consideration. More
specifically, the 100 bp decrease in the policy rate accelerates real GDP growth on
impact by around 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points prior to and during the crisis. In the
aftermath of the global financial crisis this effect increases markedly to about 0.7
percentage points.11 To put our results into perspective, we compare the cumulative
responses with established findings of the literature, that are mainly based on pre-
crisis data. In cumulative terms, the responses prior to the crisis point to an increase
in real GDP by 1.8%, and are thus on the high side of previous findings. These point
to peak level effects of about 0.3% to 0.6% (see e.g., Leeper et al., 1996; Bernanke
et al., 1997; Uhlig, 2005). In a more recent paper, Gorodnichenko (2005) reports a
peak effect in real GDP of approximately 0.8%. See Coibion (2012) for an excellent
and more comprehensive summary of the relevant literature.
Responses of output growth to the lowering of the term spread are depicted on
the right-hand side of the top panel of Fig. 2. The term spread shock accelerates
real GDP growth throughout the sample period. Our estimates are broadly in line
with those provided in Baumeister and Benati (2013) who report an annualized
impact response of about 2% for 2010. Compared to findings on the conventional
monetary policy shock, however, effects are rather short-lived and peter out after one
to two quarters. A similar picture arises when looking at a forecast error variance
decomposition, shown in the top panel of Fig. 3. At the 14-quarters forecast horizon,
the monetary policy shock explains about twice as much forecast error variance as
the spread shock.
The mid-panel of Fig. 2 shows impulse responses of consumer price inflation.
Both shocks drive up inflation by about 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points on impact,
as we have ruled out a price puzzle by assumption. Adjustment of inflation turns
negative in response to lowering the policy rate, while effects are positive and then
quickly converge to zero in response to the spread shock. Both shocks explain about
10These are based on the NBER dating of recessions, available at http://www.nber.org/
cycles.html. The full history of impulse responses over time and for all variables is available
from the authors upon request.
11Responses are to be interpreted as the reaction of a variable to a hypothetical 100 bp monetary
policy / term spread shock independent of the actual value of the FFR during that period.
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the same amount of forecast error variance throughout the sample period (mid-panel
of Fig. 3).
Next we analyze the potential transmission mechanisms starting with the wealth
channel. In the bottom panel of Fig. 2 we depict responses for consumer wealth
growth. Looking at the conventional monetary policy shock first, we find positive
responses of consumer wealth throughout most of the sample period. These effects,
however, are very short-lived and peter out immediately after impact. By contrast,
the reduction of the term spread spurs wealth growth throughout the sample periods
and effects tend to be slightly more persistent compared to responses to the monetary
policy shocked discussed before. Also in terms of forecast error variance, the term
spread shock explains about one-third more variance throughout the sample period.
Taken at face value the results reveal the wealth channel as an important facet of the
transmission mechanism through which unconventional monetary policy can affect
aggregate demand. In terms of persistence, the channel seems less important when
monetary policy is conducted by steering short-term interest rates. This result is in
line with Ludvigson et al. (2002) who attest the wealth channel only a minor role
in the transmission of conventional monetary policy to consumption.
Last, we investigate the bank lending / credit channel. Figure 4 shows the
responses of growth in assets and deposits of commercial banks as well as net interest
rate margins and Fig. 5 the corresponding forecast error variance decomposition.
[Fig. 4 about here.]
[Fig. 5 about here.]
The impact response of asset growth to a conventional monetary policy shock
is shown in the top panel of the figure. A loosening of monetary policy spurs asset
growth for all three time periods considered, responses are tightly estimated and
the effects tend to be very persistent. Next we look at growth of deposits depicted
in the mid-panel of Fig. 4. Albeit for both shocks we have assumed an immediate
acceleration of deposit growth, the effects of the term spread immediately peter
out after one quarter, while responses to the conventional monetary policy shock
are rather persistent and mostly tightly estimated. That is, the impact of the
term spread shock on asset and deposit growth is negligible, while we find tightly
estimated responses to the conventional monetary policy shock. This impression is
further confirmed by a forecast error variance decomposition, shown in Fig. 5. At
the 14 quarter forecast horizon, the spread shock accounts for about 10% of both,
error variance of banks’ asset and deposit growth. By contrast, shares accounted
for by the conventional monetary policy shock are slightly higher for bank deposit
growth through most of the sample and considerably so for asset growth. Strong
and persistent effects of a conventional monetary policy shock on asset and deposit
growth and a large share of explained forecast error variance, reveal an important
role for the credit / bank lending channel for monetary policy transmission. By
contrast, this channel seems less important in case stimulus comes from lowering
the term spread.
For completeness we show responses of net-interest rate margins in the bottom
panel of Fig. 4. An unexpected decrease of the policy rate triggers an increase in
12
net interest rate margins – probably driven by an imperfect pass through of the
policy rate change to the long end of the yield curve. After four quarters, effects
start hovering around zero and are accompanied by wide credible sets. Responses to
the term spread shock show a different pattern: Net interest rate margins decrease
in response to a lowering of the term spread. These effects are very persistent for
all three time periods considered. Naturally, and since net interest margins follow
the term spread, the term spread shock explains considerably more forecast error
variance as the conventional monetary policy shock. This holds true throughout the
sample period
Summing up we find that both shocks accelerate output growth and drive up
inflation. While the effects of a conventional monetary policy shock on output
growth are rather persistent and tightly estimated, effects of the term spread shock
are short-lived. Responses of CPI inflation are accompanied by wide credible sets for
both shocks. Positive effects on output growth seem to be driven by an expansion
of asset and deposit growth of the banking sector lending empirical support for
the importance of the credit / bank lending channel in case stimulus comes from
lowering the policy rate. By contrast, the spread shock has no significant effect
on asset and deposit growth. Rather, positive (and short-lived) effects on output
growth are triggered by an acceleration of consumer wealth growth.
3.2 Do effects vary over time?
The strength of both shocks might depend on the specific economic environment
when the shock is carried out. For example, Jannsen et al. (2014) find strong effects
of monetary policy during recessions associated with financial crises which holds
especially true for the recent global financial crisis. They attribute their finding to
the particular effectiveness of the credit / bank lending channel in a recession as
advocated in Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Others find the opposite, namely that
monetary policy is less effective in times of heightened uncertainty (Bech et al., 2014;
Aastveit et al., 2013). Considering the term spread shock, recent empirical research
hints at diminishing effectiveness of the LSAP programs (see, e.g., Wu, Tao, 2014).
So far, results reported in figures 2 and 4 have indicated changes in the strength
of the shocks’ impacts on the variables considered in this study. However, these
results might be driven by the normalization of the shocks to 100 basis points,
which is achieved by dividing through the standard deviation of the shock (which
has diminished strongly since the period the FFR is technically zero). To investigate
this further, we report the ratio of the cumulative response after 20 quarters to the
one standard deviation shock on impact, with the standard deviation varying over
the sample. These ”elasticities” are thus free of the normalization effect and show
the responsiveness of a given variable in cumulative terms to the two shocks on
impact over the sample period.
[Fig. 6 about here.]
Elasticities shown in Fig. 6 reveal a very systematic pattern over time. Stimulus
from conventional monetary policy is less effective during the period of the global
financial crisis compared to prior the crisis. This is particularly so in terms of out-
put growth for which the elasticity reaches its trough over the whole sample period
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during the crisis. Hence we qualitatively corroborate findings of Bech et al. (2014),
Aastveit et al. (2013), Hubrich and Tetlow (2014) who attribute smaller effects of
monetary policy during financial crises to balance sheet adjustments and the delever-
aging of the private sector on the one hand, and heightened uncertainty weighing
on the business climate on the other hand. Strikingly, elasticities in the aftermath
of the crisis do not simply revert back to their precrisis values. Responsiveness of
all variables except net interest rate margins even peaks during the aftermath of the
crisis. This finding is certainly less related to the episode of the crisis and its long-
lasting consequences for the economy. Rather the specific monetary environment
with the policy rate bound at zero seem to drive this result. Taken at face value,
our finding implies that monetary policy is particularly effective if the policy rate is
altered after it has been committed to a particular value for a prolonged time.
Elasticities related to the term spread shock spike for most variables during the
crisis and during the period from 2000 to 2001. In the latter period, the Clinton
debt buyback program took place, which was in many ways similar to an LSAP. See
Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) for an in-depth analysis of the buyback program
and its effect on the Treasury yield curve. This time pattern holds in particular
true for inflation, consumer wealth and growth in bank’s assets and deposits. The
effects of lowering the term spread on output growth have also diminished after
the launch of the first LSAP. Our findings thus ascribe the latter LSAPs smaller
effects on the macroeconomy than the first programs, corroborating results of Wu,
Tao (2014) and Engen et al. (2015). Engen et al. (2015) explicitly attribute the
stronger effects of the earlier programs to the fact that they have been implemented
at times when market conditions were highly strained and a signal of commitment
to accommodative policy over a longer horizon – such as the launch of quantitative
easing – would be most effective.
3.3 Robustness and extensions
In this section we investigate the robustness of our results. We do this by first
looking at another measure of banks’ asset growth taking a broader definition of the
banking sector, by including investment growth as a further variable to the system
and last by imposing another Cholesky ordering to demonstrate that our estimates
remain qualitatively unaffected.
First, since the shadow banking sector has expanded rapidly over the last decade
in the USA, it has been argued that focusing on commercial banks’ assets might
yield an incomplete assessment of monetary policy transmission (see e.g., Adrian et
al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2015). Hence we substitute commercial banks’ assets with
assets of the shadow banking sector and re-run the analysis outlined in section 3.
Shadow banks are defined as financial intermediaries that conduct functions of bank-
ing without access to central bank liquidity and in the definition following Nelson et
al. (2015) comprise finance companies, issuers of asset-backed securities and funding
corporations.12 In a nutshell, credit intermediation through the shadow banking
12Data on shadow assets (FL504090005.Q, FL674090005.Q, FL614090005.Q) are from the finan-
cial accounts data base of the federal reserve system, http://www.federalserver.gov/releases/
z1/about.htm.
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system is much like that through a traditional bank with wholesale investors at the
deposit end and at the loan origination end are finance companies and traditional
banks.
[Fig. 7 about here.]
Figure 7 shows impulse responses of asset growth, deposit growth and real GDP
growth. Overall results on real activity are nearly unaffected by inclusion of shadow
assets, albeit uncertainty of the estimates is slightly more elevated especially in
the most recent part of our sample. While the shape of asset and deposit growth
responses is very similar to our baseline estimates, including shadow assets yields
stronger responses in terms of overall magnitudes. This holds true for all time
periods considered, for both shocks and for both variables. However, these stronger
magnitudes are estimated with a lot of uncertainty and hence do not translate into
overall stronger responses of real GDP growth. Responses of the other variables are
very similar to results of our baseline estimation. This is also evident from Table 2,
top panel, which lists correlations of median impulse responses with the baseline
model. The fact that we get very similar results of asset responses to both shocks
contrasts findings of Nelson et al. (2015) who report a decrease of commercial banks’
assets and an increase of shadow assets in response to a contractionary monetary
policy shock. Since we have not restricted the responses of asset growth our results
are purely data driven and might differ to those of Nelson et al. (2015) since we use a
richer framework in terms of included variables and covered transmission channels.
Second, and as pointed out in Stein (2012) a reason why effects of asset purchase
programs might have diminished over time are smaller effects via investment spend-
ing. In principle, a decrease in longer-term borrowing costs for firms should boost
investment spending. If, however, borrowing costs are further reduced by additional
asset purchase programs, firms might simply pay back short-term debt and issue
more and cheaper long term debt. In that case, there is no additional impetus to
the economy via investment spending. To investigate this in more depth, we re-run
our analysis with gross fixed investment growth as an additional variable. We also
modify the characterization of the two shocks provided by the restrictions in Table 1.
Here we add further restrictions saying that investment growth ticks up in response
to both, a conventional monetary policy expansion and a shock to the term spread.
Fig. 8 shows the elasticity of the cumulative response with respect to the initial size
of the shock.
[Fig. 8 about here.]
Looking at investment growth points indeed to a smaller elasticity in the after-
math of the crisis compared to the crisis period itself. The pattern of the other
variables is consistent with our baseline estimates, stronger effects during the crisis
and smaller impacts in the aftermath regarding the term spread shock, while the
opposite holds true for the monetary policy shock. In general, including investment
growth has rendered elasticities more volatile in the aftermath of the crisis. This
is due to the fact that with the additional restrictions imposed it is harder to find
rotation matrices fulfilling the complete set of identifying assumptions. More specif-
ically, while impulse responses of our baseline estimate are typically based on 250 to
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300 rotation matrices each ten quarters we sample them, the number of successfully
sampled matrices decreases to about 150 per sampling point when including invest-
ment growth. Considering impulse responses, not shown, the inclusion of investment
growth leaves our results broadly unchanged.
Last and to add further confidence to our results, we change the ordering of
the variables for our estimation set up. For the baseline ordering we put real GDP
growth first, followed by inflation, wealth, short-term interest rates, banks’ deposits
and assets, the term spread and net interest rate margins. For the robustness anal-
ysis we change this ordering to real GDP growth, inflation, wealth and short-term
interest rates, the term spread, net interest rate margins and banks’ deposits and
assets. The first part of both orderings is motivated in Christiano et al. (1996) and
states that output cannot be contemporaneously affected by inflation, consumer
wealth and the policy rate. For the adjusted ordering we argue that short-term
interest rates can affect the term spread, which in turn impacts on term net-interest
rate margins and ultimately balance sheet quantities of the banking sector. As
stressed before and since we rely on an explicit identification of the shocks via sign
restrictions, the ordering of the variables should not affect our results qualitatively.
This is evident in the bottom panel of Table 2 which shows correlations of median
impulse responses based on the permuted Cholesky ordering and the baseline or-
dering. In fact, correlations are in almost all cases virtually unity. These small
differences can be well attributed to sampling error.
[Table 2 about here.]
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the effects and transmission of conventional and
unconventional monetary policy in the USA. For that purpose we have proposed
a medium- to large scale model that allows parameters to drift and residual vari-
ances to change over time. Our main results remain qualitatively unaffected when
considering an alternative measure for banking sector assets, including investment
growth as a further transmission channel and using a different Cholesky ordering in
the estimation stage of the model. These can be summarized as follows:
First, we find positive and rather persistent effects on output growth in response
to a conventional monetary policy shock. These effects seem to be driven by an
expansion of asset and deposit growth of the banking sector and thus by a broad
credit / bank lending channel. By contrast and in line with previous findings (see
e.g., Ludvigson et al., 2002), the wealth channel appears less important for the
transmission of conventional monetary policy in the USA. A forecast error variance
decomposition lends further support to these findings.
Second, we find a pronounced and distinct pattern of monetary policy effective-
ness over time. More specifically, our results point to comparably modest effects on
output growth in response to a hypothetical and unexpected lowering of the pol-
icy rate during the period of the global financial crisis. In this sense, our results
corroborate findings of a recent strand of the literature stating that monetary pol-
icy is weak in recessions associated with either high economic uncertainty or more
generally financial crises (see e.g., Aastveit et al., 2013; Bech et al., 2014; Hubrich
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and Tetlow, 2014; Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2013). There is less empirical work on
the effectiveness of monetary policy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a
period in which the main US policy rate was effectively zero. Our results show the
strongest responsiveness of the economy to a hypothetical monetary policy shock
during that period. From the perspective of a policymaker and taking a more prac-
tical stance, this finding seems less insightful, since obviously the policy rate cannot
enter negative territory. However, it is rather the fact that the policy rate has not
changed for an extended time than the level at which the policy rate stood that
drives this result. If changes in the policy rate are rare, volatility associated to a
monetary policy shock is low and a deviation from the commitment can provide a
particularly strong boost to output growth. Note, however, that a central bank’s
loss function typically consists of other additional targets such as price stabilization
and hence our finding does not directly translate into a policy recommendation to
deviate from a commitment. Still, it suggest that effects of a correction of the mon-
etary policy stance after an extended period of unchanged monetary policy might
have large macroeconomic effects.
Third, and looking at the term spread shock, we find positive but short-lived
effects on output and consumer price growth. These work mainly through the con-
sumer wealth channel and via steering inflation, while there is less evidence of impe-
tus via banks’ asset and deposit growth. This finding is also confirmed by a forecast
error variance decomposition. The decrease in the term spread triggers a fall in net
interest rate margins, making it less attractive for banks to lend. Also deposits will
increase only shortly at a given bank since investors tend to reinvest their proceeds
from selling long-term assets to the central bank rather quickly (Butt et al., 2014).
This leaves little room for the ”credit / bank lending” channel to operate in case
stimulus comes from lowering the term spread.
Last, we find that the term spread shock impacts most strongly on output growth
during the period of the global financial crisis and less so in its aftermath. Taken
at face value, this result implies that the effectiveness of the Fed’s unconventional
monetary policy measures has abated since the early programs. Smaller effects
in the most recent period stem from a decrease in stimulus of consumer wealth
and a smaller responsiveness of inflation. These might be attributed to an implicit
signaling channel which is particularly effective when financial markets are impaired
and economic conditions characterized by high uncertainty (Engen et al., 2015). In
addition, we show that effects of quantitative easing on investment growth have
diminished over time providing thereby less stimulus for overall GDP growth.
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Fig. 3: Forecast error variance decomposition
Real GDP growth
(a) Conventional monetary policy
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Notes : Forecast error variance decomposition based on the posterior median.
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Fig. 5: Forecast error variance decomposition
Banks’ asset growth
(a) Conventional monetary policy
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(b) Unconventional monetary policy
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(c) Conventional monetary policy
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Notes : Forecast error variance decomposition based on the posterior median.
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Fig. 6: Elasticity of cumulative response to size of shock on impact
(a) Real GDP growth
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(b) Inflation
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(c) Consumer wealth growth
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(d) Banks’ asset growth
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(e) Banks’ deposit growth
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(f) Net interest rate margin
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Notes: The figure shows the ratio of the cumulative response of particular variable to the impact shock of the
conventional monetary policy shock (black, solid line) and the spread shock (red, dashed line). Elasticities are
in absolute terms. The shaded grey area indicates the period of the recession associated with the global financial
crisis. 29
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Fig. 8: Elasticity of cumulative response to size of shock on impact - investment
growth included
(a) Real GDP growth
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(b) Inflation
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(c) Consumer wealth growth
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(d) Investment growth
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(e) Banks’ asset growth
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(f) Banks’ deposit growth
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Notes: The figure shows the ratio of the cumulative response of particular variable to the impact shock of the
conventional monetary policy shock (black, solid line) and the spread shock (red, dashed line). Elasticities are
in absolute terms. The shaded grey area indicates the period of the recession associated with the global financial
crisis.
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Appendix A Structural identification
To implement the sign restrictions technically, note that Eq. (2.8) can be written as
Atyt = ct +
p∑
j=1
Bjtyt−j +Λ
0.5
t vt, (A.1)
where Λ = Λ0.5t Λ
0.5
t and vt ∼ N (0, Im) is a standard normal vector error term.
Multiplication from the left by Λ−0.5t yields
A˜tyt = c˜t +
p∑
j=1
B˜jtyt−j + vt (A.2)
with A˜t = Λ
−0.5
t At, c˜t = Λ
−0.5
t ct and B˜jt = Λ
−0.5
t Bjt.
It can be shown that left multiplying Eq. (A.2) with an m×m-dimensional or-
thonormal matrix R with R′R = Im leaves the likelihood function untouched. This
implies that impulse responses are set-identified. To implement the sign restrictions
approach we simply draw R using the algorithm outlined in Rubio-Ramı´rez et al.
(2010) until the impulse response functions satisfy a given set of sign restrictions to
be chosen by the researcher. This has to be done for each draw from the posterior,
which in our application boils down to 500 draws randomly taken from the full set of
15,000 posterior draws. To speed up computation we do not search for each point in
time a new rotation matrix. Instead we look for new rotation matrices after 10 quar-
ters and check whether the restrictions are fulfilled throughout the sample. These
leaves us with 11 time periods for which we look for new rotation matrices. For
each of these time points we recovered 250 to 300 rotation matrices that fulfilled our
restrictions. There was no visible time pattern over the amount of sign restrictions
recovered throughout our sample period.
To impose the additional restriction that the short-term interest rate reacts slug-
gishly with respect to an unconventional monetary policy shock, we construct the
following deterministic rotation matrix (Baumeister and Benati, 2013)
S =
(
Im−2 0m−2×2
02×m−2 U
)
(A.3)
with
U =
(
cos(ϑ) − sin(ϑ)
sin(ϑ) cos(ϑ)
)
. (A.4)
The rotation angle is defined as
ϑ = tan−1([A˜tR′]ij/[A˜tR′]ii). (A.5)
Here, the notation [A˜tR
′]ij selects the i, jth element of the impact matrix, corre-
sponding to the contemporaneous response of variable the short-term interest rate
(variable i) to an unconventional monetary policy shock (variable j). Multiplying
the impact matrix with U from the right yields a new impact matrix that satisfies
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the set of sign restrictions specified in subsection 2.4 and the zero impact restriction
described above.
Since we assume that the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound,
we zero-out the structural coefficients of the monetary policy rule for the first eight
quarters after the shock hit the economy. This procedure, however, is subject to
the Lucas critique because economic agents are not allowed to change their behavior
accordingly. However, the findings in Baumeister and Benati (2013) suggest that the
differences between the results obtained by manipulating the structural coefficients
or by manipulating the historical structural shocks to keep the interest rate at the
zero lower bound are quite similar. Moreover, manipulating the structural shocks
gives rise to additional shortcomings like the fact that this approach ignores the
impact of agents expectations about future changes in the policy rate. In addition,
the systematic component of monetary policy implies that the short-term interest
rate reacts to different shocks. However, the unsystematic part, by construction,
offsets this behavior and the corresponding shocks would no longer originate from a
white noise process.
Appendix B A brief sketch of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm
Since we impose a Cholesky structure on the model a-priori and estimate the system
equation-by-equation our Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm consists
of the following three steps:
1. Sample aT = (a1, . . . ,aT )
′ and bT = (b1, . . . , bT )′ using the Carter and Kohn
(1994) algorithm.
2. Sample the variances of Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6) using Gibbs steps by noting that
the conditional posteriors are again of inverted Wishart form.
3. Sample hT = (h1, . . . , hT )
′ and the corresponding parameters of Eq. (2.7)
through the algorithm put forth in Kastner and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2013).
A brief description of this algorithm is provided in Appendix C.
Step 1 is a standard application of Gibbs sampling in state-space models. In step
2 we draw the parameters of the corresponding state equations conditional on the
states. Step 3 is described in more detail in the appendix. Finally note that we
sample the parameters of the different equations simultaneously.
Appendix C Sampling log-volatilities
To simulate the full history of log-volatilities for the ith equation hTi = (hi1, . . . , hiT )
′
we use the algorithm outlined in Kastner and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2013). This
algorithm samples hTi all without a loop. This is achieved by rewriting h
T
i in terms of
a multivariate normal distribution. Moreover the parameters of the state equation in
Eq. (2.7) are sampled through simple Metropolis Hastings (MH) or Gibbs sampling
steps. To achieve a higher degree of sampling efficiency we sample the corresponding
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parameters from the centered parameterization in Eq. (2.7) and a non-centered
variant given by
h˜it = ρih˜it−1 + it, it ∼ N (0, 1). (C.1)
To simplify the exposition we illustrate the algorithm for the case when i = 2, . . . ,m.
For i = 1 the same steps apply with only minor modifications. Let us begin by
rewriting Eq. (2.4) as
eit = cit −
i−1∑
s=1
ais,tyst −
p∑
j=1
bij,tyt−j = λ0.5it . (C.2)
Squaring and taking logarithms yields
e2it = hit + ln(u
2
it). (C.3)
Since ln(u2it) follows a χ
2(1) distribution we use a mixture of Gaussian distribution
to render Eq. (C.3) conditionally Gaussian,
ln(u2it)|rit ∼ N (mit, s2it), (C.4)
where rit is a indicator controlling the mixture component to use at time t with
rit ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. mit and s2it define the mean and the variance of the mixture
components employed.
The mixture indicators allow us to rewrite Eq. (C.3) as a linear Gaussian state
space model
e2it = mir,t + hit + ξit, ξit ∼ N (0, s2ir,t). (C.5)
The algorithm then consists of the following steps.
1. Sample hi,−1|rit, µi, ρi, σih,Ψit or h˜ij,−1|rij, ρi, σih,Ψit all without a loop (AWOL).
Here, Ψit = (cit, ais,t, . . . , aii−1,t, bi1,t, . . . , bip,t)′ is a vector of stacked coeffi-
cients and hi,−1 = (hi2, . . . , hiT )′. Following Rue (2001) hi,−1 can be written
in terms of a multivariate normal distribution
hi,−1 ∼ N (Ω−1hi ci,Ω−1hi ). (C.6)
Similarly the normal distribution corresponding to the non-centered parame-
terization is given by
h˜i,−1 ∼ N (Ω˜−1hi c˜i, Ω˜
−1
hi
). (C.7)
The corresponding posterior moments are
Ωhi =

1
s2rij,2
+ 1
σ2ih
−ρi
σ2ih
0 · · · 0
− ρi
σ2ih
1
s2ri,3
+ 1+ρi
ς2i
− ρi
σ2ih
. . .
...
0 − ρi
σ2ih
. . . . . . 0
...
. . . . . . 1
s2rij,T−1
+ 1+ρi
σ2ih
−ξij
σ2ih
0 . . . 0 − ρi
σ2ih
1
s2rij,T
+ 1
σ2ih

(C.8)
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and
ci =

1
s2rij,2
(y˜2ij,2 −mrij,2) + µi(1−ρi)σ2ih
...
1
s2rij,T
(y˜2ij,T −mrij,T ) + µi(1−ρi)σ2ih
 . (C.9)
Multiplying by σ2ih yields the moments for the non-centered parameterization:
Ω˜i = σ
2
ihΩhij and c˜ij = σ
2
ihcij. Finally, the initial states of h
T
i , hi1 and h˜i1 are
obtained from their respective stationary distributions.
2. Obtain the parameters of Eq. (2.7) and Eq. (C.3). Since we impose a non-
conjugate Gamma prior on σih we employ a Metropolis-within-Gibbs algorithm
to sample µi, ρi and σi for both parameterizations. For the centered variant
we simulate µi and ρi with a single Gibbs step and σ
2
i is sampled through a
MH step. For the non-centered parameterization, we sample ρi with MH and
the other parameters with Gibbs steps.
3. Sample the mixture indicators with inverse transform sampling. Note that we
can rewrite Eq. (C.3) as
e2it − hit = ξ˜it, ξ˜it ∼ N (mir,t, s2it). (C.10)
This allows us to compute the posterior probabilities that rit = j, which are
given by
p(rit = c|•) ∝ p(rit = c) 1
sik
exp
(
−(ξ˜it −mik)
2s2rit
)
, (C.11)
where p(rit = c|•) are the unnormalized weights associated with the cth mix-
ture component.
The algorithm simply draws the parameters under both parametrizations and de-
cides ex-post which of the parametrizations to use. This choice depends on the
relationship between the variances of Eq. (2.7) and Eq. (C.3). For more information
see Kastner and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2013) and Kastner (2013).
The sampled log-volatilities are shown in Fig. C.1.
Reduced form volatility of the short-term interest rate and the term spread has
increased considerably in the run-up of the global financial crisis – a period during
which the Fed has aggressively lowered interest rates. Volatility has spiked around
mid-2008 and hence in the midst of the crisis. While the crisis peak of residual
variance associated to short-term interest rate marked also the peak over our sample
period, volatility of the term spread peaked in the early 1990s.
The mid panel of Fig. C.1 shows the volatilities for variables related to the real
side of the economy. Residual variance associated to real GDP growth was ele-
vated in the early 2000s and peaked around the same time as the financial variables
discussed above. During the early 2000s the so-called ”dot-com bubble” has burst
causing slowing down the US economy. Stochastic volatility of of wealth, which
is strongly anchored on movements in stock market prices, naturally was also ele-
vated during that period. In contrast to volatility of real GDP, residual variance of
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wealth was pronounced for a longer period during the global financial crisis. Resid-
ual variance of CPI inflation started to rise more considerably from the beginning
of the 2000s until 2008 – a period which was characterized by sound growth in price
dynamics in the USA. Residual variance peaked in the aftermath of the crisis and
hence a little later than that associated to real GDP growth, when CPI inflation
reverted from negative to positive territory.
Last, the bottom panel of Fig. C.1 shows residual variance for variables related
to the banking sector. Residual variance of asset growth of commercial banks was
elevated during the early 2000s and the global financial crisis, where it peaked around
the same time as residual variance of real GDP growth, short-term interest rates and
the term spread. Since 2009 estimated volatility has declined and is considerably
smaller at the most recent period in our sample compared to its peak value. Residual
variance associated with bank deposits and net interest margins show a slightly
different pattern. Bank deposit volatility increased gradually from the beginning
of 2004 until 2009, after which it gradually started to decline until the end of our
sample period. Volatility associated to net interest margins spiked around 1997 and
peaked in late 2009. That is, for both variables, banking deposits and net interest
margins, volatility spikes during the global financial crisis occurred slightly later
than that of the other variables considered in this study.
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